Journal | Volume
Volume 177 (1)
Details | Table of Contents
On having no reason
dogmatism and bayesian confirmation
pp.1-17
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9578-9
The epistemic goal of a concept
accounting for the rationality of semantic change and variation
pp.19-40
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9623-8
What ought probably means, and why you can't detach it
pp.67-89
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9640-7
The no-miracles argument, reliabilism, and a methodological version of the generality problem
pp.111-138
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9642-5
Corroboration and auxiliary hypotheses
Duhem's thesis revisited
pp.139-149
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9643-4Publication details
Journal: Synthese
Volume: 177
Issue: 1
Year: 2010
Full citation:
(2010) Synthese 177 (1).