The third well-known theory of truth is the coherence theory which is absolutely irreconcileable with ours, since it holds that the truth of a belief that A is B depends not on whether A is B, but on how far the belief that it is forms part of a coherent system. The absurdities which result from this view have been most amusingly set out by Mr Russell in his essay "On the Monistic Theory of Truth" in Philosophical Essays,¹ but although this reductio ad absurdum is a conclusive refutation of the theory, it is still, I think, instructive to consider some of the arguments used by its adherents both in defending their own and in attacking rival positions. According to Mr Russell the fallacy in all these arguments lies in their assuming the axiom of internal relations [and are therefore invalid], but it seems to me that part of what his opponents say does not depend for its plausibility on this axiom and may be worth a fresh investigation. Without going into any great detail it will, I think, be possible to show that the Coherence Theory is largely based on a serious confusion the unfortunate consequences of which extend far beyond the present context. Since, unlike the Correspondence Theory and Pragmatism, the Coherence Theory is almost entirely concerned with Question I and hardly at all with Question II, I propose to say all I have to say about it in the present chapter.