The previous chapter dealt with the problem of how we are to distinguish knowledge from mere belief. In all epistemologies knowledge, along with justification, rationality, etc, are normative, evaluative notions that carry with them the idea that our critical canons have been applied to our beliefs. As we will see, a number of the theorists to be discussed in Parts II to IV deny that there is anything to the norms of knowledge and rationality other than what is found in local practices embedded in local cultural and political contexts. And the norms vary dependently on their varying context. Even though they understand such local contexts naturalistically, part of their blindness about the norms of epistemology and methodology is their belief that if there are such norms then they must transcend the natural — from which they conclude 'so much the worse for norms". Even though there are "naturalistic" norms embodied in local practices, there is no role for the more robust norms of epistemology and methodology. So, before turning to these theorists in Part II to IV, it is necessary to investigate the ways in which the normative principles of method get their force and authority.