Phenomenological Reviews

Book | Chapter

178974

The self

Maurice Natanson

pp. 48-52

Abstract

According to Sartre, every action is, in principle, intentional; and true action implies a consciousness of acting on the part of the actor. Thus, if someone throws away a lighted cigarette which happens to set off a fuse, which in turn produces an explosion, he has not acted. On the other hand, true action has been taken by the worker whose job it is to follow out the steps required to set off a dynamite charge.1 Since action is necessarily intentional, no political or economic fact can cause action in the individual. Motivation is inner.2

Publication details

Published in:

Natanson Maurice (1973) A critique of Jean-Paul Sartre's ontology. Dordrecht, Springer.

Pages: 48-52

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-010-2410-5_4

Full citation:

Natanson Maurice (1973) The self, In: A critique of Jean-Paul Sartre's ontology, Dordrecht, Springer, 48–52.