We have attempted to recover Husserl's theory of perception after the genetic turn. While many have spoken of such a theory and some have given us clues as to what it must be, this study may be the first to suggest a reformulation of the notion of meaning and, correspondingly, of the perceptual noema. If so, then we have undercut the basis upon which most critiques of Husserl rest and, at the same time, established the need for a new level of critical interaction with his phenomenology. In this chapter we must attempt a first evaluation of what we have found, with a view toward developing Husserl's theory. The implication of Husserl's description of the dynamics of perception for his theory of intentionality will first concern us. Following this, we will test the adequacy of his formulation of the components of perceptual acts. Finally, we will add some ideas to the study of perceptual meanings.