No doubt the careful reader will be puzzled by what seems like a two chapter digression into the intricacies and obscurities of Husserl's grammar. Is this not a book on Husserl's phenomenology of meaning and is it not sufficient to lay out the claim that meanings are noema and then go on with the business of understanding their relationship to consciousness? Many, perhaps most, works on Husserl have done precisely that. In so doing, however, they have glossed over what is most interesting and, at the same time, most problematic concerning Husserl's theory of intentionality. Meaning is not one thing nor is it a single kind of formation. Not only have we seen that there are at least four different forms which a core-formation can have (form_{n, s, a} and _r), but we have also seen that there are at least four elementary ways of combining and, therefore, of referring with these core-formations. Without understanding this and the structural interrelationship between the formation and their predicative combinations, the noema becomes no more than some magical mass bridging mind and matter.