Phenomenology as transcendental phenomenology is centered in a description of meaning interpreted in relationship to acts of consciousness. Seen systematically, meaning is the category about which the transition from the natural to the phenomenological attitude pivots, as well as the category in terms of which the various components of mental acts are studied. For Husserlian analysis a transcendental clarification of meaning can be contrasted to a psychologistic interpretation, which reduces meaning to an element of mental acts naturalistically analyzed (images) or, further, to direct or indirect modes of referring. It can also be contrasted to a formalistic interpretation, which reduces meaning to the set of rules constitutive of its relationship to other intensional entities or, in the case of the transposing of its results ontologically, of its relationship to other parts and wholes. Over against the first, Husserlian analysis stresses the transcendence of meaning and the difference between meaning and mental representations. Over against the second, it recovers the interelationship of experience and meaning and even the historicity of meaning. Yet once this is said, difficulties of untold complexity appear when we pursue a deeper study of this central motif of transcendental phenomenology, and when we attempt to integrate it into the difference between static and genetic method.