The heart of Meinongian object theory is its intensional identity conditions for existent and nonexistent objects alike. An object, conceived independently of its ontic status, is supposed to be identified by its constitutive properties, and possesses those properties, consequently, independently of its ontic status. Since not all properties are constitutive, the division between constitutive and extra-constitutive properties is vital to a properly metaphysically grounded Meinongian object theory. If there are grey area properties that do not clearly belong to either the constitutive nor extraconstitutive category, then from the outset the complete ideally well-demarcated Meinongian reference domain cannot be formally comprehended. The same distinctions must also be made under a theory of multiple modes of predication, where the same ontically loaded property such as existence is predicated of objects in different ways or in different senses, one that identifies a specific intended object, and another in which an object actually exemplifies the property. To categorize such properties, object theory should advance a sympathetic synthesis of both previously competing solutions, Meinong's modal moment proposal, and his exclusion of extraconstitutive properties from intensional identity conditions for intended objects. The two approaches are not exclusionary, and their cooperation avoids potentially ruinous consequences for the objective mind-independent comprehension of a Meinongian object theory domain.