This essay considers Meinong's object theory in light of criticisms originating in Russell's 1905 essay "On Denoting'. A general defense of object theory exposes misinterpretations of Meinong's writings on Russell's part, and explains some of the main strengths and advantages of Meinong's logic and semantic theory overriding Russell's objections. The problem of offering a generalized theory of definite descriptions to supplement Russell's analysis for existent definitely described objects is addressed, and an alternative definite description protocol is proposed in a Meinongian semantic environment of existent and nonexistent intended objects and their distinguishing constitutive properties. Meinong's reference to a golden mountain (discussed previously by Hume and Berkeley) is developed as an analogy for Meinong's object theory reference domain of existent and nonexistent objects alike, without regard for their ontic status, in accord with Meinong's doctrine of the Außersein of the pure object. As a window on how Meinong is perceived after Russell's criticisms, Russell's previous correspondence with Meinong and reviews of Meinong's writings are combed for clues as to why Russell so dramatically turns against Meinong's object theory in unflagging allegiance thereafter to Frege's referential existentialism and semantic domain of exclusively existent entities.