Phenomenological Reviews

Book | Chapter


The integrity of intentionality

sketch for a phenomenological study

Matthew Ratcliffe(Phenomenological Psychopathology and Philosophy of Psychiatry, FernUniversität Hagen)

pp. 207-229


In this chapter, Matthew Ratcliffe addresses the question "what constitutes the sense of being in one kind of intentional state, rather than another?' In other words, in virtue of what do we experience ourselves as currently perceiving that p rather than, for instance, currently imagining that p? Ratcliffe also seeks to show how a productive phenomenological research program can be pursued by engaging with first-person accounts of anomalous experiences, such as those that arise in the context of psychiatric illness. The principal example discussed is "thought insertion': somehow experiencing one's own thoughts as someone else's. The nature of certain so-called "hallucinations' is also considered.

Publication details

Published in:

Simmons J Aaron, Hackett James Edward (2016) Phenomenology for the twenty-first century. New York, Palgrave Macmillan.

Pages: 207-229

DOI: 10.1057/978-1-137-55039-2_11

Full citation:

Ratcliffe Matthew (2016) „The integrity of intentionality: sketch for a phenomenological study“, In: J.A. Simmons & J.E. Hackett (eds.), Phenomenology for the twenty-first century, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 207–229.