The criticisms we set out in the preceding chapters concerning the various difficulties and self-cancelling contradictions affecting objectivist premises are intended to be fundamental. They go to the heart of our research by casting serious doubt upon the adequacy of a naturalistic form of objectivist approach to the study of hate crime. There remains, however, more constructive implications to the Husserlian critiques we set out during our earlier chapters.This chapter will, therefore, consider the various difficulties arising from the natural attitude's subject/object dichotomy, and argue that this generates a vital need to consider the diametrically opposite position of Husserlian phenomenology as a possible constructive alternative response to, even remedy for, the problems that our own radically different phenomenological approach to hate crime has already diagnosed. Moreover, that the various criticisms already contain in seed form the basis of a distinctly "intentional analysis' of hate crime as experienced. The next section will show how, at least in principle, such analysis may be able to resolve some of the methodological problems we have already diagnosed with academic approaches that are shaped by the natural attitude's merger of objectivism and naturalism.