Phenomenological Reviews

Book | Chapter

212231

The primacy of practical reason

Nathan Rotenstreich

pp. 111-131

Abstract

Reason (Vernunft) connotes, in Kant's system, (a) the whole of the supreme faculty of knowing, (b) reason proper, which unites that which has been already dealt with by understanding (Verstand) and creates the highest unity of knowing. Kant in a way inherited the medieval distinction between intellectus and ratio. Yet he does not stress the difference between Verstand (ratio) and Vernunft (class="EmphasisTypeItalic ">intellectus) in terms of the difference between the discursive process of achieving knowledge (ratio) and the ultimate possession of knowledge (intellectus). Kant's distinction points to a different aspect: understanding unites the sense- data, while reason unites the unifying forms of uniting the data. This being the position of reason, reason cannot be realized, because it lacks by definition the data to be applied to.

Publication details

Published in:

Rotenstreich Nathan (1972) Experience and its systematization: studies in Kant. Dordrecht, Springer.

Pages: 111-131

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-010-2811-0_6

Full citation:

Rotenstreich Nathan (1972) The primacy of practical reason, In: Experience and its systematization, Dordrecht, Springer, 111–131.