Phenomenological Reviews

Book | Chapter

192091

The technical act and technology

Nathan Rotenstreich

pp. 206-232

Abstract

An ethical act rests on the formation of the will; the will that is formed guides the acts that flow from it. Aristotle's conception is well known, namely, that as a result of the force of habit we reach a point where we perform acts in accordance with a proper principle. To the sphere in which acts are guided by pre-arrangement without being continually dependent on the guidance of the formed will belong such institutions as the law, the state, and so forth. The institutions determine ways of conduct, habits, and the directions of acts. The reason for the existence of institutions lies in the fact that such institutions need not continually go back to the source of the deed in the sphere of the individual doer; they need not rely on the will, on the acknowledgment of responsibility with its attendant decisions and similar components that determine the nature of the ethical deed. Institutions guide deeds in what is called the proper direction without relying on the individual doer's acknowledgment of propriety. Thus, for example, in the sphere of law where it is determined by legislation that men of a certain age are eligible for military service, such a law is not based on the personal initiative of the people concerned, or rather not solely on this initiative, nor is it based on the initiative of all the people subject to this law.

Publication details

Published in:

Rotenstreich Nathan (1977) Theory and practice: an essay in human intentionalities. Dordrecht, Springer.

Pages: 206-232

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-010-1098-6_15

Full citation:

Rotenstreich Nathan (1977) The technical act and technology, In: Theory and practice, Dordrecht, Springer, 206–232.