Continuing with the analysis of his Critique of Abstract Principles, Solov"ëv's excursion into epistemology largely mirrors Hegel's treatment of similar issues in the Phenomenology, albeit with a different, though superficially similar, intent. However, we see that Solov"ëv's Critique presupposes his own standpoint, even though he endeavors to portray a dialectical movement from one epistemological position under investigation to another. In this chapter, I show how Solov"ëv conceived this movement. We look at Solov"ëv's own critique of epistemology as first philosophy and his idea that all that can be said to exist in whatever fashion has a possessor leading ultimately to an absolute existent. However, anxious to avoid the charge of pantheism Solov"ëv denies that this existent is simply identical with the universe. In this chapter, we will see that his reasoning involves a move that relinquishes the logical in favor of a speculative and religious ontological claim. Finally, in this chapter we will deal with Solov"ëv's belief that faith is responsible for our immediate certainty in the objectivity of the intentional object of cognition. The emphasis here will be on contrasting his position with those of Kant and Hegel.