Scarcely two decades ago, those scholars interested in the history of the philosophy of science had to spend the bulk of their time justifying the existence of this field as a proper and legitimate branch of philosophy. Although prepared to concede that metaphysics, ethics and epistemology all had distinguished temporal careers, laden with present-day significance, most philosophers of science were convinced that philosophy of science really began during their own lifetimes, probably in Vienna; if it had any prior ancestry at all, it was generally traced no further back than Duhem, Mach, and Poincaré, along with occasional footnotes to Hume and Aristotle. The small coterie of scholars who were convinced that the story was a bit more complicated generally suppressed their internal disagreements and closed ranks — at least in public — in order to persuade their philosophical colleagues that the history of methodology was a fiorishing, exciting and relevant area of inquiry which deserved serious study and attention.