The preceding chapter of this study showed that despite Heidegger's charge in 1927 concerning the naivety of Greek ontology, the analytic of Dasein is nourished by an appropriation of Aristotle's account of movement. The question of movement, however, is but one aspect of Heidegger's positive appropriation of Aristotle in the dismantling return of the early 1920s. The texts from this period show that the elaboration of the analytic of Dasein draws, in addition, from the richness of the anthropology inherent in Aristotle's practical writings. In particular, the essay of 1922, Phenomenological Interpretations with Respect to Aristotle, shows that Aristotle's account of phronesis or prudence is of fundamental importance for the analysis of Dasein's authenticity, its authentic appropriation of itself as a being-possible. This would mean, then, that in the course of the 1920s Heidegger would have developed one aspect of Aristotle's determination of human being as a remedy to the ontological naivety and inauthenticity concerning human being from which it itself would suffer. If not exactly a "paradox',¹ this is certainly remarkable.