The interpretation of quantum indeterminacy is relevant to Meinongian object theory because it suggests that with no ability simultaenously to determine a microparticle's position and momentum there is something metaphysically incomplete about all of physical reality. We do not want to say that the Taj Mahal is an incomplete nonexistent Meinongian object because there are predicational gaps in the properties of its microstructural physical components. The implications of quantum physics for Meinongianism and conversely suggest a solution that does not make all of the physical world incomplete as a nonexistent Meinongian intended object, provided that incompleteness is judged by the standard of relevant predicational completeness and incompleteness. The analogy worked is that between irrelevant predicational incompleteness such as that involving property and property-complement pairs that do not apply to paradigm objects that are assumed to exist. Although the Taj Mahal is neither prime nor non-prime (in the number theory sense), this does not make it any less existent. A similar strategy, when the distinction is established, is then offered to suggest that a quantum microphysical particle does not fail to exist in Meinongian object theory, merely on the grounds that it lacks position if its momentum is determined, and lacks momentum if its position is determined. It can be considered instead to be the kind of existent object in Meinongian terms for which relevant predicational incompletenesses are not decided on the basis of the simultaneous possession of the two classical physical determinants that are properly applied only to macrophysical entities.