Tarski's model set theoretical analysis of logical truth presupposes a reduction principle, according to which, if a universally quantified sentence is true, then all of its instances are logically true. Etchemendy, in a recent critique, rejects the reduction principle on the basis of what he finds to be intuitive counterexamples. He proposes a philosophical diagnosis of his sense of the failure of Tarski's account due to its commitment to the principle. Etchemendy's objections to the reduction principle are avoided when Tarski's quantificational criterion of logical truth is applied to a Meinongian domain of existent and nonexistent objects, rather than a referentially extensional domain of existent entities only. The conclusion is not that Tarski intended a Meinongian object theory domain for his analysis of logical truth, but that Etchemendy's criticisms inadvertently show this to be its proper semantic application where the objections are forestalled.