Phenomenological Reviews

Series | Book | Chapter

177948

The problem of consciousness in Aristotle's psychology

Juha Sihvola

pp. 49-65

Abstract

There is no single term in Aristotle's works or other classical philosophical texts that could be translated as "consciousness' on all occasions. No wonder that there have been some modern philosophers who have denied that Aristotle even had a notion of consciousness.1 However, the notion of consciousness is far from unambiguously understood and defined in today's philosophy. There is a wide variety of uses for the term reaching from knowledge in general to intentionality, introspection, and phenomenal experience. The question whether Aristotle had a notion or a theory of consciousness cannot be informatively answered before explicating the kind of consciousness we are looking for.

Publication details

Published in:

Heinämaa Sara, Lähteenmäki Vili, Remes Pauliina (2007) Consciousness: from perception to reflection in the history of philosophy. Dordrecht, Springer.

Pages: 49-65

DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4020-6082-3_2

Full citation:

Sihvola Juha (2007) „The problem of consciousness in Aristotle's psychology“, In: S. Heinämaa, V. Lähteenmäki & P. Remes (eds.), Consciousness: from perception to reflection in the history of philosophy, Dordrecht, Springer, 49–65.