There is an inveterate tendency among philosophers to view their distinguished predecessors and colleagues in terms of fixed doctrines or systems, antagonisms between such doctrines, and inexplicable moves from one doctrine to another rather than in terms of dialectical development and progressive problem-solving. Jaakko Hintikka has protested against this tendency in the case of Aristotle and tried to produce a counter-example.¹ It is even more distressing to find a contemporary or near-contemporary figure subjected to a similar treatment. It seems to us that this fate has befallen Wittgenstein to a far greater extent than has been recognized. This paper is a modest attempt to put the dynamics of Wittgenstein's development into perspective by using a few key concepts as our focal points. They include the notions of showing, ostensive definition, language game, rule, and criterion, Our attempt if based on our earlier joint work on Wittgenstein. ² For reasons of space, we have to assume that the reader has some familiarity with our earlier papers.