Book | Chapter
On saying what you really want to say
Wittgenstein, Gödel, and the trisection of the angle
pp. 373-425
Abstract
Wittgenstein's remarks on the first incompleteness theorem1 have often been denounced, and mostly dismissed. Despite indirect historical evidence to the contrary,2 it is a commonplace that Wittgenstein rejected Gödel's proof because he did not, or even could not, understand it.3 Kreisel twice used the word "wild" when he reviewed Wittgenstein on Göde1.4 Dummett, in many respects an admirer of Wittgenstein's philosophy, wrote that the remarks on Gödel and on the notion of consistency are "of poor quality or contain definite errors".5 Gödel's own comments were damning (see Section III below).
Publication details
Published in:
Hintikka Jaakko (1995) From Dedekind to Gödel: essays on the development of the foundations of mathematics. Dordrecht, Springer.
Pages: 373-425
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-015-8478-4_15
Full citation:
Floyd Juliet (1995) „On saying what you really want to say: Wittgenstein, Gödel, and the trisection of the angle“, In: J. Hintikka (ed.), From Dedekind to Gödel, Dordrecht, Springer, 373–425.