In the present essay I wish to argue that Edmund Husserl's phenomenological account of eide,the essential features of the lived meanings of things, shares—by analogy—many intriguing features with the objects and principles of contemporary physics, especially quantum mechanics and quantum cosmology. In demonstrating this, I wish to contrast Husserl's "philosophy as a rigorous science" with two other versions of "scientific philosophy," those of Carnap and Quine. My object is twofold: first, I wish to argue that Husserl's version of "scientific philosophy" shares many intriguing features with twentieth-century physics, whereas the "scientific philosophies" of Carnap and Quine seem to fit more properly with pre-twentieth century (classical Newtonian) physics; secondly, I wish to suggest that Husserl's account of eide seems to be no more "metaphysical" (in the traditional sense of the modern period in philosophy) than are the theories, concepts and models offered by (at least the careful) quantum physicists, and that this non-metaphysical stance is in fact postmodern.