Phenomenological Reviews

Series | Book | Chapter

147289

The indeterminacy of images

an approach to a phenomenology of the imagination

Junichi Murata

pp. 169-183

Abstract

The use of words then being to stand as outward marks of our internal ideas, and those ideas being taken from particular things, if every particular idea that we take in should have a distinct name, names must be endless. To prevent this, the mind makes the particular ideas received from particular objects to become general; which is done by considering them as they are in the mind such appearances, separate from all other existences, and the circumstances of real existence, as time, place, or any other concomitant ideas. This is called ABSTRACTION, whereby ideas taken from particular beings become general representatives of all of the same kind; and their names general names, applicable to whatever exists conformable to such abstract ideas. Such precise, naked appearances in the mind, without considering how, whence, or with what others they came there, the understanding lays up (with names commonly annexed to them) as the standards to rank real existences into sorts, as they agree with these patterns, and to denominate them accordingly.1

Publication details

Published in:

Hopkins Burt C (1999) Phenomenology: japanese and american perspectives. Dordrecht, Springer.

Pages: 169-183

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-017-2610-8_9

Full citation:

Murata Junichi (1999) „The indeterminacy of images: an approach to a phenomenology of the imagination“, In: B.C. Hopkins (ed.), Phenomenology, Dordrecht, Springer, 169–183.