The concluding chapter addresses the question of the unity of the horizon. I turn to Merleau-Ponty's and Derrida's readings of Husserl's "Origin of Geometry" so as to exemplify the multifaceted ways in which the horizon-problematic in Husserl's phenomenology lends itself to interpretation. Given the seemingly endless diversity, it is by far not clear if the horizon is not merely a semblance of numerous themes that are only by chance given one and the same name. I argue that the horizon obtains its unity as a figure of intentionality. I further suggest that as a figure of intentionality, the horizon is not accidentally, but necessarily both a horizon of subjectivity and the world-horizon. I conclude by suggesting that the strength of Husserl's way of thematizing the horizon consists in disclosing subjectivity in terms of those dimensions, which remain overlooked in post-Husserlian approaches to the horizon-problematic, as they are exemplified in philosophical hermeneutics and French phenomenology.